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Abstract: P2P lending activities have grown rapidly and have caused the huge and complex networks 
of debtor-creditor relationships. The aim of this study was to study the underlying structural 
characteristics of networks formed by debtor-creditor relationships. According attributes of P2P lending, 
this paper model the networks of debtor-creditor relationships as an evolving networks with addition 
and deletion of nodes. It was found that networks of debtor-creditor relationships are scale-free 
networks. Moreover, the exponent of power-law was calculated by an empirical study. In addition, this 
paper study what factors impact on the exponent of power-law besides the number of nodes. It was 
found that the both interest rate and term have significantly influence on the exponent of power-law. 
Interest rate is negatively correlated with the exponent of power-law and term is positively correlated 
with the exponent of power-law. Our results enriches the application of complex networks.  
Key words：P2P lending; networks of debtor-creditor relationships; degree distribution; exponent of  
Power-law; preferential attachment 
1 Introduction 
P2P(Peer-to-Peer) lending is a type of social lending where lenders and borrowers can do business 
without the help of institutional intermediaries such as banks. The concept is not new, but it is basically 
an individual, who is not a financial institution, lending money to another individual. A potential 
borrower lists a loan application with term, interest rate and principal on website of P2P lending 
platform. Individual lenders invest their money among the wide selection of loans listing on website. 
Then a new type of networks of debtor-creditor relationships is formed by this behavioral mechanism. 
The networks of debtor-creditor relationships are based on individuals without financial institutions. 
On the other hand, this behavioral mechanism makes P2P lending different from traditional social 
lending which is limited to friends or relatives, because most lenders and borrowers of P2P lending do 
not know each other, and P2P lending activities beyond the limits of geographical space, cultural and 
religious.  
In recent years, P2P lending activities have grown rapidly. For example, As of September 30, 
2017, the largest P2P lending platform Lending club has facilitated $31.2 billion in loan originations 
since it beginning operations in 2007. The number of unique borrowers on Lending club increased over 
the prior year by 104%, 125%, 151%, 116% and 96% for the years ending December 31, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. The number of unique lenders on Lending club increased over the 
prior year by 32%, 37%, 44%, 28% and 39 %, for the years ending December 31, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014 and 2015, respectively. This is significant for facilitating more efficient deployment of capital and 
improve the economy. Because the ability of individuals and small businesses to access affordable 
credit is essential to stimulating and sustaining a healthy, diverse and innovative economy, when 
traditional banks have higher fixed costs of underwriting and servicing, are ill-suited to meet 
individuals s and small business demand for small balance loans. Before the emergence of P2P lending, 
most of individual lenders generally lack the size and access to invest in structured products directly 
and are unable to invest in individual and small business credit in a meaningful way, but P2P lending 
activities have changed this situation.  
A large and growing number of recent papers studied contagion via interbank markets and OTC 
markets by network theory. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) are among 
the first to study contagion in financial networks [1-2]. Other for example Leitner (2005), Mistrulli 
(2011), Lenzu and Tedeschi (2012), Paltalidis, Gounopoulos and Kizys(2015), Glasserman and 
Young(2015),  Georg(2013), Lux(2016) and so on[3-9]. While interbank networks have been 
extensively analyzed, the networks of individual debtor-creditor relationships are much less studied. 
The reason may be that the scale of networks of individual debtor-creditor relationship limited to 
friends or relative was small in past, and the impact of default risk of individual debt is not alike the 
default risk of commercial banks in the financial market.  
The emergence of the P2P lending provides the basis of F and make it is possible for researching 
large-scale networks of individual debtor-creditor relationships. Because there are more than thousands 
of thousands individuals involved in the loan originations through website of P2P lending platform. For 
example, “Yirendai” listed on NYSE, one of Chinese P2P lending platform, in the full year of 2017, it 
facilitated $6,364.0 million of loans to 649,154 qualified individual borrowers through its online 
marketplace, and facilitated 592,642 lenders with total investment amount of $7,388.9 million1. In other 
words, this also means that “Yirendai” has created a huge networks of debtor-creditor relationships 
between about 650,000 borrowers and 600,000 lenders in 2017. As a result, the scale of networks of 
debtor-creditor relationships formed by P2P lending is huge, and it is more complicated. 
Understanding the characteristics of individual debtor-creditor relationship networks is helpful for 
lending platform to control risks and to attract more borrowers having high credit score. Because P2P 
lending platform generates revenue from transaction and servicing fees of borrowers and lenders. P2P 
lending exhibits network effects that are driven by the number of participants and investments enabled 
through the lending platform. If many borrowers default and lending platform are unable to maintain 
borrower and lender trust, there will be a decline in the network effects of lending platform or in 
satisfactions of borrowers and lenders. At the same time, when borrowers and lenders have to search 
for a new lending platform for matching finance, the cost will be increasing. In short, the stable and 
growth debtor-creditor relationship networks are not only important for a lending platform but also for 
both borrowers and lenders. A lending platform make great efforts to attract marketplace participants 
continuously, when there are new loan originations means the debtor-creditor relationship networks are 
increasing. On the other hand, if the borrowers have paid off the principal and interest on maturity, the 
debtor-creditor relationships between borrowers and lenders are cleaned, which means deletion of 
edges or nodes from the networks of debtor-creditor relationships. In short, the networks of 
debtor-creditor relationships could be regarded as dynamic social networks. 
In the past decades, it has witnessed a great development of studying and understanding the 
modern theory of complex networks. Some earlier studies mainly focused on foundation of the random 
network theory and have shown that different networks generally share some common topological 
properties such as small-world effects (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) [10], preferential attachment and 
scale-free features (Barabási and Albert, 1999) [11]. Other studies have found fruitful applications in 
fields as diverse as the mobile phone networks (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte and Lefebvre,2006) [12], 
Internet (Yook, Jeong and Barabási,2002)[13], biological interacting(Ravasz, Somera and Mongru 
etc,2002) [14], citation networks(Goldberg, Anthony  and  Evans,2015)[15], scientific collaboration 
                                                             
1 Yirendai Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Financial Results 
networks(Ding,2011, Wallace, Larivie`re and Gingras,2012)[16-17], movie actor networks(Herr, Ke, 
Hardy and Börner,2007) [18], project collaboration networks(Liu, Han and Xu,2015) [19] and many social 
networks. The study of social networks has been traditionally hindered by the small size of the 
networks considered and the difficulties in the process of data collection, and data was collected 
usually from questionnaires or interviews (Ramasco, Dorogovtsev and Pastor-Satorras 2004) [20]. In the 
past few years, the computerization of data acquisition and the availability of high computing power 
make it is possible to study complex topology of networks of debtor-creditor relationships, which have 
largely been neglected in the studies of traditional disciplines of social networks. 
In this paper, we model the networks of debtor-creditor relationships as an evolving networks with 
addition and deletion of nodes. Our research is related to the work of Moore, Ghoshal and Newman 
(2006) [21], their studies provided a theoretical framework. This paper contributes to the literature in 
three respects. First, we provide an important case of social networks with addition and deletion of 
nodes in real-world networks by P2P lending activities. Second, we provide an empirical study of 
networks of debtor-creditor relationships based on the complex network theory, and we find that 
networks of debtor-creditor relationships are scale-free networks, finally we get the range of the 
exponent of power-law. Third, we study what factors impact on the exponent of power-law besides the 
number of nodes, and we find that the both interest rate and term significantly influence the exponent 
of power-law. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how to form the networks of 
debtor-creditor relationships by P2P lending activities, and model the networks of debtor-creditor 
relationships based on addition and deletion of nodes. Section 3 describes the data, defines the sample, 
and provides a simple summary of our studies. Section 4 is a short conclusion. 
2 Networks of debtor-creditor relationships 
2.1 Debtor-creditor relationships of P2P lending 
Firstly, Let us to define what is the networks of debtor-creditor relationships of P2P lending by a 
simple example case in Fig.1. Suppose that time was at t=0, one of borrowers listed his loan application 
on website of P2P lending platform such as loan amount was $3000, term was 3 months and interest 
rate was 6%. We denoted this borrower by ‘Borrower1’. After that, four lenders (‘Lenderi’, i=1, 2, 3, 4) 
have lent ‘Borrower1’ $1000, $500, $600 and $900 respectively. Then the networks of debtor-creditor 
relationships between ‘Borrower1’ and ‘Lenderi’ (i=1, 2, 3, 4) were formed. In addition, suppose that 
time was at t=1, a new borrower (‘Borrower2’) listed his loan application on website of P2P lending 
platform. A new lender (‘Lender5’) and senior lenders (‘Lender3’ and ‘Lender4’) have lent ‘Borrower2’ 
respectively. Above process showed the growth of networks of debtor-creditor relationships for P2P 
lending activities.  
On the other hand, as it was shown in Fig.2. Suppose that time was at t=T after one month, a loan 
of ‘Borrower2’ was expired, and ‘Borrower2’ had only this loan. When ‘Borrower2’ have paid off 
principal and interest rate on time, the debtor-creditor relationships between ‘Borrower2’ and other 
lenders who lent ‘Borrower2’ money were cleaned. ‘Borrower2’ also was removed from the networks of 
debtor-creditor relationship. At the same time, there was a new borrower (‘Borrowerk’) that listed his 
loan application on website of P2P lending platform, and two new lenders (Lenderi and Lenderj) and 
other senior lenders have lent ‘Borrowerk’ money respectively. In short, Fig.2 not only showed the 
deletion of debtor-creditor relationships because of an expired loan, but also shows the addition of new 
debtor-creditor relationships. 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
         
                   
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 An example of debtor-creditor relationships  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
According the formation of the networks of debtor-creditor relationships in Fig.1 and Fig.2. We 
denote the borrowers and lenders by the nodes and denote the debtor-creditor relationships by the edges 
in a graph. Because this paper only focus on the debtor-creditor relationships between borrowers and 
lenders, it don’t need to discriminate who is debtor or creditor. As a result, the debtor-creditor 
relationships in Fig. 1 and Fig.2 can be denoted by the undirected networks in Fig.3.  
Based on above definitions, the aim of this paper is to explore the evolution of networks of 
debtor-creditor relationships with deletions of nodes because of expired loans, and with additions of 
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nodes because of new loan origination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Evolving networks of debtor-Creditor relationships  
Suppose that at time t0, the networks of debtor-creditor relationships consists of n vertices and m 
edges. A node represents a lender or a borrower, and an edge represents the debtor-creditor relationship 
between a lender and a borrower. The degree ki of node i means that node i had ki  debtor-creditor 
relationships with other nodes. Let 𝑝௞  denotes the fraction of nodes that have degree k at a given time. 
By definition, there is the normalization: 
  ∑ 𝑝௞ = 1ஶ௞ୀଵ                                    (1) 
And the average degree 〈𝑘〉 of the networks of debtor-creditor relationships is: 
 〈𝑘〉 = ∑ 𝑘𝑝௞ஶ௞ୀଵ                                  (2) 
〈𝑘〉 represents the mean number of debtor-creditor relationships between lenders and borrowers. For 
the networks of debtor-creditor relationships with n nodes and m edges, 〈𝑘〉 = ଶ௠
௡
.  
An edge that represents a debtor-creditor relationship will be deleted from the networks of 
debtor-creditor relationships when the loan expires and borrower pays off principal and interest. If a 
node that represents a lender or a borrower has no debtor-creditor relationships with other nodes, then 
the node will be deleted from the networks of debtor-creditor relationships. At any time, the number of 
loans that will be expired is known according to the term of each loan, so the number of nodes that will 
be deleted from the network is known also. But the number of new debtor-creditor relationships that 
will be added to the network is not known, and ye it is not known that how many new nodes that 
represents a lender or a borrower will be added to the network of debtor-creditor relationships. Then we 
make the assumptions as following. In each unit of time, one node is deleted from the networks of 
debtor-creditor relationships because of some expired loans, and r nodes are added to the networks of 
debtor-creditor relationships because of some new loan originations. In addition, when a new node is 
added to the networks of debtor-creditor relationships, there are c edges are added to the network. For 
example, if a new node is a borrower, there are c lenders to lend him (her) money. If a new node is a 
lender, he (she) will lend c borrowers for the aim of risk dispersion. Above assumptions was based the 
properties of P2P lending, and our assumptions are different from the assumptions of Moore et al. 
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Fig.3 The evolution of network of debtor-creditor relationships  
(2006) that a single node is added and r nodes are deleted in each unit of time.  
In each unit of time, there are r-1 nodes that are added to the networks of debtor-creditor 
relationships and 𝑟𝑐 − 〈𝑘〉 edges that are added to the networks of debtor-creditor relationships. After 
t unit of time, the number of nodes that are added to the networks of debtor-creditor relationships are 
𝑛∗ = (𝑟 − 1)𝑡, the number of new edges that are added to the networks of debtor-creditor relationships 
are 𝑚∗ = (𝑟𝑐 − 〈𝑘〉)t, the average degree of new added nodes is 〈𝑘〉∗: 
〈𝑘〉∗ = ଶ௠
∗
௡∗
= 2 (௥௖ି〈௞〉)୲
(୰ିଵ)୲
= 2 ௥௖ି〈௞〉
୰ିଵ
                         (3) 
Let 〈𝑘〉∗ = 〈𝑘〉, then get 
 〈𝑘〉 = ଶ௥௖
ଵା௥
                                       (4) 
If 𝑟 = 1, the number of added nodes is equal to the number of deleted nodes, the scale of the networks 
of debtor-creditor relationships is constant, and there is 〈𝑘〉 = 𝑐.  
In order to study that how a new borrower or lender chooses c other lenders or borrowers for 
investing or borrowing. Let 𝜋௞ denotes the total probability that the given edge attaches to any node of 
degree k, since each edge must attach to a node, this also immediately implies that the correct 
normalization for 𝜋௞  is (Moore ,2006): 
∑ 𝜋௞𝑝௞ = 1ஶ௞ୀଵ                               (5) 
According to the method described by Moore et al. (2006), given at time t, there were n nodes in 
the debtor-creditor relationships network. The number of nodes with degree k is 𝑛𝑝௞ . The next unit of 
time this number was (𝑛 + 𝑟 − 1)𝑝௞ᇱ . The variations of this number was influenced by addition and 
deletion of nodes. If a node with degree k-1 connected to an added node with c edges, the number of 
nodes with degree k will be increased by 𝑐𝜋௞ିଵ𝑝௞ିଵ. If a node with degree k connected to an added 
node, the number of nodes with degree k will be decreased by c𝜋௞𝑝௞. In short, when r new nodes were 
added in the network of debtor-creditor relationships, the variations of number of nodes with degree k 
is: 
𝑟δ௞௖ + 𝑟𝑐𝜋௞ିଵ𝑝௞ିଵ − 𝑟c𝜋௞𝑝௞                        (6) 
In Eq.(6) , δ௞௖ was defined by: 
δ௞௖ = ൜
1, 𝑘 = 𝑐
0, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑐                               (7) 
On the other hand, if a node was removed from network of debtor-creditor relationships, the degree 
of neighbors of removed node with degree k+1 was changed to k, the number of nodes with degree 
k will be increased by (𝑘 + 1)𝑝௞ାଵ, the degree of neighbors of removed node with degree k was 
changed to k-1, the number of nodes with degree k will be decreased by k𝑝௞. If the degree of 
removed node was k, the number of nodes with degree k will be decreased by 𝑝௞. In short, the 
variations of number of nodes with degree k is 
(𝑘 + 1)𝑝௞ାଵ − 𝑘𝑝௞ − 𝑝௞                           (8) 
Finally, According to the Eqs.(6) and (8), the evolution of the number of nodes with degree k is 
governed by a rate equation as follows: 
(𝑛 + 𝑟 − 1)𝑝௞ᇱ = 𝑛𝑝௞ + 𝑟δ௞௖ + 𝑟𝑐𝜋௞ିଵ𝑝௞ିଵ − 𝑟𝑐π௞𝑝௞ + (𝑘 + 1)𝑝௞ାଵ − 𝑘𝑝௞ − 𝑝௞      (9) 
Setting 𝑝௞ᇱ = 𝑝௞, the Eq.(9) is equal to: 
0 = rδ௞௖ + rcπ௞ିଵ𝑝௞ିଵ − 𝑝௞(r + 𝑟cπ௞ + k) + (k + 1)𝑝௞ାଵ            (10) 
Then both sides of Eq.(10) multiplied by z୩: 
0 = 𝑟δ௞௖𝑧௞ + rcπ௞ିଵ𝑝௞ିଵ𝑧௞ − 𝑝௞(r + 𝑟cπ௞ + k)𝑧௞ + (k + 1)𝑝௞ାଵ𝑧௞       (11) 
Summing Eq.(11) over 𝑘(𝑘 = 0,1,2, ⋯ , ∞): 
0 = 𝑟δ௞௖ ∑ 𝑧௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ + 𝑟c ∑ π௞ିଵ𝑝௞ିଵ𝑧௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ − ∑ 𝑝௞(r + 𝑟cπ௞ + 𝑘)𝑧௞ஶ௞ୀ଴ + ∑ 𝑝௞ାଵ(𝑘 + 1)𝑧௞  ஶ௞ୀ଴  (12) 
Let us denote the generating functions of 𝑝௞ and π௞𝑝௞ as following: 
𝑓(z) = ∑ π௞𝑝௞ 𝑧௞ஶ௞ୀ଴                         (13) 
𝑔(z) = ∑ 𝑝௞ 𝑧௞ஶ௞ୀ଴                           (14) 
Substituting Eqs.(13) and (14) into Eq. (12), then get: 
0 = 𝑟𝑍௖ + rc𝑓(𝑧)(𝑧 − 1) − r𝑔(z) − (𝑧 − 1) డ௚
డ௭
                (15) 
The “preferential attachment” mechanism means that a node connect to others in proportion to 
their degree (Barabási and Albert, 1999). This mechanism is same as the Matthew effect of P2P 
lending market. For example, a new added lender may be more willing to lend those borrowers who 
had borrowed money successfully from others because of their good credit rating, and a new added 
borrower may be got a loan from those lenders who had lent many borrowers. Then suppose that the 
probability of an added edge attaching to a node with degree k was proportional to k, then setting 𝜋௞ =
𝐴𝑘 with constant A. 
∑ 𝜋௞𝑝௞ = ∑ 𝐴𝑘𝑝௞ஶ௞ୀଵ = 𝐴 ∑ 𝑘𝑝௞ஶ௞ୀଵஶ௞ୀଵ = 1  
𝐴 =
1
∑ 𝑘𝑝௞ஶ௞ୀଵ
=
1
〈𝑘〉
 
𝜋௞ = 𝐴𝑘 =
𝑘
〈𝑘〉
 
 𝑓(z) = ∑ ௞
〈௞〉
𝑝௞ 𝑧௞ =
ଵ
〈௞〉
∑ 𝑘𝑝௞ 𝑧௞ =ஶ௞ୀ଴ஶ௞ୀ଴
௭
〈௞〉
∑ 𝑘𝑝௞ 𝑧௞ିଵ =
௭
〈௞〉
డ௚
డ௭
ஶ
௞ୀ଴           (16) 
Substituting Eq.(16) into Eq. (15), then get: 
డ௚
డ௭
ቂ(1 − 𝑧)(rc ௭
〈௞〉
− 1)ቃ + r𝑔(z)−= 𝑟𝑧௖                   (17) 
Substituting 〈𝑘〉 = ଶ௥௖
ଵା௥
  into Eq. (17), then get: 
డ௚
డ௭
−
మೝ
భశೝ
(ଵି௭)( మభశೝି௭)
𝑔(z) =
మೝ
భశೝ௓
೎
(ଵି௭)(୸ି మభశೝ)
                       (18) 
If r=1, which means that the network of debtor-creditor relationships is a constant-size network. We 
didn’t discuss this special because it was discussed by Moore et al.(2006) and it was inconsistent with 
the actual P2P lending market. 
If r≠ 1, the Eq. (18) is an ordinary differential equation, and the general solution of Eq. (18) is  
𝑔(𝑧) = 𝐵𝑒
∫
మೝ
భశೝ
(భష೥)( మభశೝష೥)
ௗ௭
+ 𝑒
∫
మೝ
భశೝ
(భష೥)( మభశೝష೥)
ௗ௭
∫ ௥௓
೎
(ଵି௭)(೥(భశೝ)మ ିଵ)
 𝑒
∫ ି
మೝ
భశೝ
(భష೥)( మభశೝష೥)
ௗ௭
𝑑𝑧         (19) 
One of integrating factors is: 
∫
ି మೝభశೝ
(ଵି௭)( మభశೝି௭)
𝑑𝑧 = ∫[
మೝ
ೝషభ
ଵି௓
−
మೝ
ೝషభ)
మ
ೝశభି௭
]𝑑𝑧 = ଶ௥
௥ିଵ
𝑙𝑛
| మೝశభି௭|
|ଵି௭|
                         (20) 
If r> 1, α = ଶ
௥ାଵ
< 1, then get a special solution in [α, z]: 
𝑔(𝑧) = ଶ௥
ଵା௥
ቀ௭ିఈ
ଵି௭
ቁ
ି మೝೝషభ × ∫ ௧
೎
(ଵି௧)(௧ିఈ)
௭
ఈ (
ఈି௧
ଵି௧
)
మೝ
ೝషభ𝑑𝑡                (21) 
Setting: 
𝑢 =
𝛼 − 𝑡
1 − 𝛼
       𝑡 = 𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑢 
And Substituting 𝑢 and t into Eq. (21), then get: 
𝑔(𝑧) = ଶ௥
ଵା௥
ቀ௭ିఈ
ଵି௭
ቁ
మೝ
ೝషభ × ∫ (ఈି(ଵିఈ)௨)
೎
(ଵିఈା(ଵିఈ)௨)(ఈି(ଵିఈ)௨ିఈ)
ഀష೥
భషഀ
଴ ቀ
ఈିఈା(ଵିఈ)௨
ଵିఈା(ଵିఈ)௨
ቁ
మೝ
భషೝ ൫−(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑑𝑢  
𝑔(𝑧) =
2𝑟
1 + 𝑟
ቀ
𝑧 − 𝛼
1 − 𝑧
ቁ
ି ଶ௥௥ିଵ × න
(𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑢)௖
(1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝑢)𝑢
ఈି௭
ଵିఈ
଴
ቀ
𝑢
1 + 𝑢
ቁ
ଶ௥
௥ିଵ 𝑑𝑢 
𝑔(𝑧) = ଶ௥
ଵା௥
ቀ௔ି௭
ଵି௭
ቁ
ି మೝೝషభ × ∫ (ఈି(ଵିఈ)௨)
೎
(ଵିఈ)௨మ
௨
ଵା௨
ഀష೥
భషഀ
଴ ቀ
௨
ଵା௨
ቁ
మೝ
ೝషభ 𝑑𝑢  
𝑔(𝑧) =
2𝑟
1 + 𝑟
ቀ
𝑎 − 𝑧
1 − 𝑧
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Setting: 
γ =
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𝑟 − 1
  
Then get: 
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ஓ
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The exact solutions of such as the Eq.(22) was discussed by Moore et al. (2006), and the degree 
distribution was a power-law with exponent γ: 
𝑝௞  ~ (γ − 1)𝑘ିஓ ∫ 𝑒ି(ଵିఈ)௫
ஶ
଴ 𝑥
ఏିଶ𝑑𝑥 = ௰(ஓ)(ଵିఈ)ಋషభ 𝑘
ିஓ           (23) 
In Eq.(23), 𝛤(γ) = ∫ 𝑒ି௫ஶ଴ 𝑥
ஓିଵ𝑑𝑥   is 𝛤-function. In the limit 𝑟 → ∞, the network of debtor-creditor 
relationships is power-law behavior 𝑝௞  ~𝑘ିஓ with preferential attachment.     
3 A Case of P2P lending  
3.1 Description of the Data 
Renrendai.com has rapidly grown into one of the largest P2P lending market in China. By 
February 2018, Renrendai.com had facilitated over $7.8 billion in loans2. Our dataset were the samples 
of listing posted on Renrendai from website’s inception in October 2010 through December 2014, but 
it don’t include those loan originations which had not been funded. Fig.4 shows the network of 
debtor-creditor relationship by 31 October 2010. 
The yellow nodes represents lender, blue nodes represents borrowers and red nodes represents 
someone who was a borrower of loan originations was a lender of other loans. The number in the node 
was unique identification of participant on Renrendai.com. Because we focused on the existing of 
debtor-creditor relationships, for convenient study, we ignored the question that who was borrower or 
                                                             
2   www.renrendai.com 
lender. 
 
By 31 December 2014, there were 151759 nodes and 3716699 edges in the network of 
debtor-creditor relationships. The data in Fig.5 shows the number of nodes in the network of 
debtor-creditor relationships, and the data in Fig.6 shows the number of edges in the network of 
debtor-creditor relationships. The data in Fig.7 shows the number of added nodes, and the data in 
Fig.8 shows the number of added edges.  In Fig.5~Fig.8, there was a clear trend of increasing in 
debtor-creditor relationships network since 2013, this trend of increasing due to P2P lending market 
rapidly expanded in China since 2013. 
Suppose that ௡ೖ
௡
 was the actual fraction of nodes that have degree k in the network of 
debtor-creditor relationships at a given time. According to 𝑝௞  ~𝑘ିஓ, setting  𝑘ିஓ =
௡ೖ
௡
,  then 
𝑙𝑛 ௡ೖ
௡
=  −γ ln 𝑘                            (24) 
Based on above equation and the actual data of degree distribution at every day, the exponent of 
power-law degree distributions γ can be calculated by OLS method (in Fig.11). The data in Fig.11 
shows that there was a clear trend of increasing while the number of nodes represents the borrowers or 
lenders rapidly increased in 2013. But the exponent of power-law  γ didn’t increased rapidly while the 
number of nodes rapidly increased yet in 2014. Then the data in Fig.9 shows the exponent of 
power-law degree distributions γ may be approximately in the range of 1.84-1.93. The data in Table 1 
shows the simple summary statistics about the exponent of power-law γ. 
The data in Fig.9 and Fig.10 shows the number of deleted nodes and edges due to the expired 
loans. The data in Fig.11 shows the number of degree of whole network and the average degree of 
added nodes in each day. It was found that the average degree of whole network may be approximately 
40. From Table 3,we can see that the average degree of whole network in 2013 was less than average 
degree of whole network in 2012, because the increasing rate of nodes was less than the increasing rate 
of edges in 2013 while the increasing rate of nodes more than the increasing rate of edges in 
2012(Table 2). More added nodes does not correspond with more added edges means that although 
there were more and more persons take parted in P2P lending market, the lending-borrowing activities 
of each participant may be downed. 
 
 
Fig.4: The network of debtor-creditor relationship by 31 October 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5: The number of vertices in debtor-creditor relationships network Fig.6: The number of edges in debtor-creditor relationships 
Fig.11: The exponent of power-law degree distributions Fig.12: The average degree of debtor-creditor relationships network 
Fig.7: The number of added nodes in debtor-creditor relationships network Fig.8: The number of added edged in debtor-creditor relationships network  
Fig.9: The number of deleted nodes in debtor-creditor relationships network Fig.10: The number of deleted edges in debtor-creditor relationships 
  
Table 1 The exponent of power-law 
Year Min Max mean St. dev 
2010 0.0648 0.9296 0.7900 0.1249 
2011 0.8935 1.3369 1.1730 0.1057 
2012 1.3151 1.5144 1.3842 0.0478 
2013 1.4994 1.8848 1.7503 0.1091 
2014 1.8427 1.9269 1.8759 0.0219 
Table 2  Number of nodes and edges 
Date 
Number of 
nodes 
Number of 
edges 
The rate of increasing 
nodes 
The rate of increasing 
edges 
2010/12/31 151 1048 --- ---- 
2011/12/31 3483 45348 2306.62% 4327.10% 
2012/12/31 11850 236115 340.22% 520.67% 
2013/12/31 59330 1137474 500.68% 481.75% 
2014/12/31 151759 3716699 255.79% 326.75% 
Table 3 Average degree of network 
Year Min Max mean Std. Dev. 
2010 1.00  14.26  9.80  3.2176  
2011 11.68  27.78  19.59  4.2828  
2012 24.76  44.65  37.94  6.3267  
2013 32.33  39.83  35.07  2.1079  
2014 38.34  49.04  43.67  3.0985  
3.2 Factors of influencing the exponent of power-law 
Although there are a lot of literatures studying network with the power-law distributions of degree, 
little attention has been paid to the factors of influencing the exponent of power-law.  
Refer to Eq. (24), it is known that  γ  is relevant to  ln(𝑛). Beyond this, we consider that the 
properties of loans have some impact on γ. For example, lenders preferentially to make a loan with 
higher interest rate or lower risk, as a result, loan originations with higher return or lower risk will 
attract more lenders to lend them money. In other words, loan originations with higher return or lower 
risk may lead to more edges represented the creditor-debtor relationship. In order to test whether the 
properties of loans affect exponent of power-law, the data in Fig.11 denoted by γ௧   was the dependent 
Fig.13: The average term of loan  Fig.14: The average interest rate of loan  
variable and the average interest rate denoted by 𝑅௧  and average term denoted by 𝑀௧  were 
independent variables respectively. The data in Fig.13 was 𝑀௧, and the data in Fig.14 was 𝑅௧.  ln(𝑛௧) 
was controlling variable, and 𝑛௧ is the number of nodes each day. Finally the model was: 
               𝛾௧ = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝑅௧ + 𝛽𝑀௧ +  φ ln(𝑛௧) + 𝜀௧                       (25) 
Finally the number of our sample were 1353 and date were in 12 October 2010 through 31 
December 2014. Because there weren’t new loan originations on web of P2P lending platform at some 
days, this lead to the 𝑅௧ and 𝑀௧ were equal to 0 on those days, so we don’t choose those data that 𝑅௧ 
and 𝑀௧  were equal to 0. Table 4 presented the summary statistics for our sample and Table 5 
presented the Pearson correlations for our sample. 
Table 4 Summary Statistics of variables 
variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
𝛾௧ 1.49 1.42 1.93 0.06 0.32 
𝑛௧ 28367.87 9557 151759 5 38207.59 
𝑅௧ 0.1355 0.1306 0.234 0.09 0.018 
𝑀௧ 15.35 11 36 3 9.6 
Number of observations: 1353 
Table 5 Pearson correlations of variables 
     
Correlation 𝛾௧  𝑅௧  𝑛௧  𝑀௧  
𝛾௧ 1.000000    
𝑅௧  -0.535755 1.000000   
𝑛௧  0.767023 -0.386482 1.000000  
𝑀௧  0.832488 -0.319328 0.781582 1.000000 
     
     Finally to estimate Eq. (25) by OLS method and got: 
 
     𝛾௧∗ = 0.368 − 0.701𝑅௧ + 0.0074𝑀௧ + 0.124 ln(𝑛௧)               (26) 
                                                              (−5.962)∗∗∗    (25.894)∗∗∗      (80.566)∗∗∗    
                 
In Eq.(25), the coefficient of 𝑅௧ shows that the exponent of power-law is negatively correlated 
with the interest rate. Given a degree k, the coefficient of 𝑅௧ shows that higher interest rate leads to 
lower exponent of power-law and 𝑘ିఊ is larger, 𝑘ିఊ represents the probability that a debtor has k 
creditor-debtor relationships. In other words, lenders preferentially choose the borrowers who give 
higher interest rate of loan originations. The coefficient of 𝑀௧ shows that the exponent of power-law is 
positively correlated with the term of loans, which means that longer-term lead to higher exponent of 
power-law and 𝑘ିఊ is smaller. In other words, lenders preferentially choose the borrower who give 
shorter-term of loan originations. In short, these results are coincident with the risk characteristic of 
P2P lending market such as higher default risk lead to lender to demand higher return and higher 
uncertainty lead to lender to choose short-term of investing.  
4 Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied the networks of debtor-creditor relationships in P2P lending market. 
According to the loan attributes such as there must exist a date on which debtors must pay off the 
principal and interest, and after debtors do it, the debtor-creditor relationships are cleaned. In addition, 
consider new debtor-creditor relationships have come into being continually due to new loan 
originations, the networks of debtor-creditor relationships evolve with addition and deletion of nodes. 
In short, these actual lending activities provide a case for theory model of evolving network. 
Consider the loan attributes and based on a different assumption from Moore et al. (2006), yet 
getting the same conclusion that the degree distribution of an evolving network with addition and 
deletion of nodes is satisfied with power-law distribution under preferential attachment. In our case, the 
result of empirical study is consistent in power-law distribution, and the exponent of power-law of 
degree distributions γ may be approximately in the range of 1.84~1.93. On the other hand, as Moore et 
al. (2006) have commented, although the exponent of power-law generated by theoretical model appear 
not to be in agreement with the result in our case. There are good reasons to believe that the networks 
of debtor-creditor relationships are scale-free networks if it appears a net growth network.   
In addition, we study what factors impact on the exponent of power-law besides the number of 
nodes. We find that the both interest rate and term have significantly influence on the exponent of 
power-law degree distributions. Interest rate is negatively correlated with the exponent of power-law 
and term is positively correlated with the exponent of power-law. This result is significant because 
most previous studying of network don’t care for what factors impact on the exponent of power-law. 
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